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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Î

Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N . Resnick**
SUBORDINATION OF THE
GUARANTOR’S SUBROGATION
RIGHTS—THE MARSHALING
DOCTRINE REVISITED

the marshaling doctrine. This sug
gestion is sound and is consistent
with the conclusion of our article:

A recent inquiry from one of
our readers with reference to our
article’ on marshaling of assets
poses the question of whether un
secured creditors or the debtor’s
estate will ultimately benefit if the
principle of marshaling is applied
to compel a secured^ creditor to
foreclose on a guarantor’s collat
eral. The reader suggests that in
such a case, the guarantor ordi
narily would step into the shoes of
the secured creditor by virtue of
the equitable principle of subroga
tion, and would thereby have the
right to exhaust the debtor’s col
lateral and leave the debtor’s es
tate and unsecured creditors in
the same position they would
have been in absent application of
'* Counsel to the law firm of Levin &
Weintraub & Crames, New York City
member of the National Bankruptcy Con
ference.
** Bepjamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra
University School of Law, Hempstead
New York: associate member of the Na
tional Bankruptcy Conference.
' “ Compelling a Senior Lienor to
Pursue Remedies Against a Guarantor
—A Misapplication of the Marshaling
Doctrine,” 18 U.C.C.L.J. 178 (1985)
(hereinafter referred to as “ article” ).

Except in rare cases where fraud or
other inequitable conduct justifies
piercing the corporate veil so as to
treat a corporate debtor and a
shareholder guarantor as the same
entity, the marshaling of assets
doctrine should not be used to
compel a secured creditor to pur
sue remedies against a guarantor’s
assets.^

It is important to note that the
“ rare cases” where marshaling
should be ordered involve situa
tions where the guarantor’s sub
rogation to the lienor’s position
should not be allowed because of
the equitable doctrine of subordi
nation.^ For example, in In re
Rich Supply House, Inc.,^ which
we cited in footnote 16 of our arti
cle, the court held* that “ facts
sufficient to sustain a piercing of
the corporate veil may establish
independent and separate equities
which may overcome a deficiency
in the common debtor require
ment.” ^ Once these facts have
been found and the guarantor’s
property has become the property
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^Id. at 181-182.
’ See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c).
< 43 Bankr. 68 (N.D. Bl. 1984).
5 Id. at 70.
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of the debtor, it follows that the
same facts that pierced the corpo
rate veil lead, of necessity, to the
equitable doctrine of subordina
tion to prevent the guarantor from
stepping into the shoes of the se
cured creditor.
The Tampa Case
The recent case of In re Tampa
Chain Company, Inc.^ is directly
in point. Tampa Chain was
founded for the purpose of man
ufacturing jewelry. It s t^ e d busi
ness on March 30, 1982, upon ob
taining from Fundex Capital Cor
poration (“ Fundex”) a working
capital loan in the face amount of
$194,760 which was secured by a
security interest in Tampa Chain’s
inventory, receivables, and other
assets. There was no question as
to the validity and perfection of
the security interest. From the
face amount of the loan, there had
been deducted $74,760 for interest
at 20.85 percent, legal fees and
filing costs, leaving net proceeds
of $118,086.50.
On July 25, 1983, an involun
tary petition under chapter 7 was
filed against Tampa Chain, and
after the order for relief, a trustee
took possession of its assets
which were liquidated, realizing
approximately $200,000. Fundex
sought an order pursuant to Sec
tion 725 of the Bankruptcy Code
‘ 13 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 792 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).

directing the trustee to turn over
to it a portion of certain inventory
proceeds, sufficient to satisfy
Fundex’s secured claim, attor
neys’ fees, costs and charges al
lowed under Section 506(b). The
trustee, in response, sought a
marshaling order requiring Fun
dex to first proceed against Wolf
and Rachael Reichard as guaran
tors of Tampa Chain’s debt to
Fundex and then against the
cooperative apartment (“ Co-op” )
supporting the Reichards’ guaran
tee before proceeding against the
debtor’s estate or, in the alterna
tive, an order equitably assigning
Fundex’s rights to the collateral in
the event the trustee must satisfy
Fundex’s lien out of the debtor’s
estate.
Findings of Fact
After the trial of the issues, the
court made the following sig
nificant findings of fact. First, the
loan was made not on the strength
of the collateral owned by Tampa
Chain, or the likelihood that
Tampa Chain would successfully
repay it, but on the protection af
forded by the Reichards’ mortgag
ing their three bedroom Co-op to
secure payment of their guarantee
of the loan. Tampa Chain at the
time had no assets, a paltry
$2,500, no operating history, and
no capital. Fundek agreed to
make the loan notwithstanding the
poor operating history of its own
ers, the guarantors, and others in
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another corporation partially
owned by Wolf Reichard, known
as M.C. Merchandising, Inc.
(“ M.C.”). The loan was granted
only after an officer of Fundex in
spected the Co-op and received
the consent of the Co-op board
and concluded that the Co-op had
an estimated value of $300,000.
Other agreements with the
Reichards bolstered Fundex’s po
sition with respect to its ability to
cash out the Co-op in the event of
a default. Consistent with Fun
dex’s reliance on the Co-op for
payment, Fundex did not determine
whether Tampa Chain bought the
inventory or the equipment that it
stated that it would buy with the
loan proceeds, nor did it monitor
the operations.
Second, by the end of June
1982, 56 percent of the proceeds
of the loan made by the Tampa
Chain were disbursed to or for the
benefit of Wolf Reichard, his wife’s
brother, his friends or others. As a
result, “ in the first four months of
its brief life,’’ Tampa Chain had
$23,000 in sales and spent all of
the $118,000 advanced by Fun
dex. Although Wolf Reichard
claimed that he made capital con
tributions in excess of the with
drawals, the court discounted
these contributions, focusing on
what happened in the early
months of operations and the sub
stantial withdrawals during that
period.
Third, although the Reichards
ultimately contributed up to
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$261,000 to the corporation, ex
penditures of $315,000 of Tampa
Chain’s funds were disbursed
throughout its history for either
the direct or ultimate benefit of
Reichard, his brother-in-law, and
other companies owned by the
family, such as M.C., which oper
ated on Tampa Chain’s premises.
Inventory was transferred to
M.C. for which Tampa Chain
never received payment. The re
sult of such transfers was a finan
cial revival of M.C., which was
able to run its own business as
well as to make large “ loans” of
cash to Wolf Reichard to pay
other monthly charges for the
Reichards’ Co-op and to transfer
money to his personal friends.
Fourth, Rachael Reichard also
profited by Tampa Chain paying
$60,000 to a pawn shop to redeem
her personal jewelry, and paying
$5,783 of maintenance obligations
on the Co-op owned by her and
her husband.
Was the Trustee a Secured
Creditor?
After discussing the principle of
marshaling (which requires the
senior creditor to exhaust the
single charged fund before satisfy
ing its claim against the doubly
charged fund so as to do equity
between the sénior and junior
lienors), the court turned to the
Reichards’ objection that the
trustee was not a junior creditor.
The Reichards had cited both In
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re Computer Room'' and In re
McElwaney* which «held that the
trustee was not allowed to invoke
the doctrine of marshaling by vir
tue of a status as a hypothetical
lien creditor; for to do so would
“ frustrate the Code’s general pol
icy of leaving creditors in the
status they enjoy under state law,
by enacting unsecured creditors
over secured creditors.’’® The
court, however, rejected the ar
gument holding that Section
544(a)(2) of the Code is a principal
exception to that policy and such
rights and powers are to apply in a
marshaling context. “ In New
York, an unsatisfied execution
creditor has rights to the personal
property of a debtor served with a
writ of execution superior to all
but prior secured creditors and
bona fide purchasers for value.
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 5202(a)
(McKinney 1978). The trustee is
thus to be deemed a secured cred
itor.’’*“

that both sources of payment be
long to a common debtor. Ordi
narily, this requirement is not met
where the two funds sought to be
marshaled are held separately by
a corporation and its shareholder
even though he guaranteed corpo
rate debt. ” " This statement led to
a search for a separate fund to
complement the coinmon fund.
Several courts have held th at w hen
a guarantor who is àlso a control
ling shareholder provides the len
der w ith the prim ary collateral
needed to obtain a w orking capital
loan to either initiate or continue
th e operation o f th e d eb to r corpo
ration, the “ com m on d eb to r” re
quirem ent is satisfied and the
equitable rem edy o f m arshaling is
available. . . . U nder such circum 
stances, the collateral pledged by
th e guarantor/shareholder is held,
by those courts perm itting m arshal
ing, to be the equivalent o f a capital
contribution to th e corporation
w hich a co u rt in equity should con
sider as a fund for the corporation
itself, so th at th ere is a “ com m on
d eb to r.” *^

The Common Debtor
Requirement

Having stated the principle of
“
capital
contribution” constitut
Having established the trustee
ing
a
fund
so as to create a com
as a secured creditor, the court
mon
debtor
with two funds which
turned to the requirement that
had
been
espoused
by several
marshaling traditionally “ required
courts, the bankruptcy court ob
served that:
’ 24 Bankr. 732 (N.D. Ala. 1982). See
article, note 1 supra, at 180.
« 40 Bankr. 66 (M.D. Ga. 1984). See ar
ticle, note 1 supra, at 180.
’ tn re Tampa Chain Co., 13 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. at 794.
">Id.

" In re Tampa Chain Co., 13 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. at 794. (emphasis added).
Id. at 794-795. The court cited as au
thority Farmers & Merphants Bank v.
Gibson, 7 Bankr. 437 (N^D. Fla. 1980).
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[A] m ore w idespread acceptance is
the notion th at w here the corporate
veil should be pierced upon th e ap
plication o f traditional doctrine,
equity will subject th e property o f
individual shareholders to the
claim s o f corporate creditors
thereby satisfying the “ com m on
d eb to r” requirem ent for m arshal
ing. . . . P ursuant to th a t doctrine,
the corporate veil will be disre
garded
in
fraud,
inadequate
capitalization and alter ego cases.

Holding that neither the alter
ego theory nor the inadequate
capitEilization doctrine applied in
the case at bar, since separate
books and records were kept by
the debtor from those of the
Reichards and subsequent con
tributions of capital had been
made by Wolf Reichard, the court
was “ reluctant to find a ‘common
debtor’ merely through a lender’s
supplying working capital pur
suant to a loan collateralized by a
debtor’s assets merely because a
guaranty was also collateralized
by personal assets as in Jack
Green’s Fashions and Multiple
Services. T h e court observed
that it need not consider the issues
raised in those cases, which were
criticized in our previous article.
The court distinguished those is-

In re Tampa Chain Co., 13 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. at 795.
Id. The court was referring to In re
Jack Green’s Fashions for Men—Big and
Tall, Inc., 597 F.2d 130(8th Cir. 1979), and
In re Multiple Services Indus., Inc., 18
Bankr. 635 (E.D. Wis. 1982).
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sues from the instant case “ where
the senior creditor looked to the
collateral for the guaranty of the
loan for protection and where the
evidence amply demonstrates
highly inequitable conduct by the
shareholders/guarantors.” ' * The
court further stated that:
Finding a com m on d ebtor . . . has
th e effect o f first liquidating th e col
lateral p osted by the corporate
principals and requiring them to
share equally w ith or be subordi
nated to their claim against the debt
o r upon subrogation. E quitable
subordination, as a com panion doc
trine o f the disregard o f th e corpo
rate veil, lies w here the principal(s)
engaged in fraud o r other inequitable
conduct to the harm o f creditors or
an unfair advantage to th e claim ant
and is not con trary to principles o f
bankruptcy law .’*

The inequitable conduct of the
guarantor was summarized by the
court as the “ continuous use of
Tampa Chain as a personal piggy
bank from which the Reichards
withdrew much of Tampa’s initial
capitalization” which was re
plenished through depositing Wolf
Reichard’s own funds and then
by transferring approximately
$770,000 in inventory to another
family-owned company “ on hard” In re Tampa Chain Co., 13 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. at 795.
Id. The court cited as authority
Stuhley v. United States Small Business
Administration {In re United Medical Re
search, Inc.) 12 Bankr. 941 (C.D. Cal.
1981).
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ly commercial t e r m s . A d d e d
to this were other badges of
fraud, such as lack of adequate
consideration, close family rela
tionships between the parties, re
tention of possession, benefit or
use of the property in question,
and, finally, the financial condi
tion of the party sought to be
charged before and after the
transaction in question.
No attempt was made by Fundex to defend Wolf Reichard’s
conduct, but it argued that there
was less evidence to connect
Rachael Reichard with his course
of dealing, that she was not a
shareholder £ind held the Co-op as
a tenant by the entirety. The court
held to the contrary; that she was
a shareholder, that she benefited
from some of the transactions,
that she redeemed her personal
jewelry by Tampa paying $60,000
of its funds, and that monies from
Tampa and M.C. were used for
the Co-op. “ For all these reasons
the common debtor requirement
is satisfied.” **
Moreover, Fundex would not
be prejudiced by marshaling,
since any deficit resulting from the
sale of the Co-op would be pro
tected by application to the dou
bly charged fund in the possession
of the trustee. The court, how
ever, disallowed interest for late
charges because the charges

were, in effect, penalties and no
proof had been offered by Fundex
of actual loss. However, attor
neys’ fees were allowed since the
promissory note obligated the
debtor upon default of any in
stallment to “ pay all costs of col
lection, including reasonable at
torney’s fees,” The court over
ruled the trustee’s objection that
this was not a collection matter,
but the agreement to consider 20
percent as reasonable was subject
to the court’s determination.
Conclusion
The Tampa case is readily iden
tified as one of the “ rare cases” in
which we favor use of the mar
shaling doctrine to compel a lienor
to proceed against a guarantor’s
collateral. Does this mean 'that
every guarantee collateralized by
personal property requires the
lender to maintain a constant sur
veillance and monitoring over
the principal debtor’s business
activities on penalty of finding
the marshaling doctrine being
applied? The court was careful to
indicate, as we emphasized
above, that “Ordinarily this re
quirement [of a common debtor]
is not met where the two funds
sought to be marshaled are held
separately by a corporation and
its shareholder even though he
guaranteed corporate debt.” *®We

In re Tampa Chain Co., 13 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. at 796.
'»Id.
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limit the case to situations where
reliance is primarily on the
guarantor’s collateral and not on
the net worth of the principal
debtor, and sufficient facts exist
to warrant the piercing of the cor
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porate veil based on inequitable or
fraudulent conduct. Under such
circumstances Section 510(c)
should be applied to subordinate
the guarantor’s claim of subroga
tion.
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